Could Pretoria’s reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine put it on the wrong side of history? – New African Magazine

Why has South Africa’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine been so muted and could it risk leaving the country on the wrong side of history? We ask Stephen Williams.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the South African government’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) issued a statement that called for Russia to “immediately withdraw its forces”.

However, all indications suggest that President Cyril Ramaphosa was not happy with his stance. Instead, he called for mediation and insisted that this was the responsibility of the UN’s Security Council.

While Ramaphosa did not countenance Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, neither did he condemn it. That left a number of observers puzzled at South Africa’s muted response, and Ramaphosa’s suggestion that the UN’s Security Council should mediate seemed to overlook the fact that Russia, sitting on the council, held a veto over any concluding motion.

So why all the confusion? Two main arguments were presented by South African political analysts. The first was a question about historical ties with the USSR, which supported the ANC in the struggle years of the antiapartheid movement.

Despite the huge differences between the USSR (and present-day Russia), it was also noted there is still a visceral hatred of the West within ANC. It was the West that supported the apartheid regime for so long and allowed business connections with its vile racist ideology -driven economy.

Do you pledge allegiance to the BRICS?

Another explanation was that South Africa felt it owed Russia an allegiance because of its membership in the Brazil, Russia India, China, South Africa (BRICS economic bloc).

However, BRICS has never been deemed to be a political alliance – rather, it is envisaged as a grouping of major developing countries attempting to build their economic strengths through a common strategy of trade policies.

It is true that Russia has been trying to strengthen its ties with other BRICS members. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, made a rare overseas visit to China – ostensibly to mark the beginning of the Winter Olympics. Nobody knows if he briefed his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on his intentions regarding Ukraine’s invasion.

Rumours that Russia might try to counter financial sanctions by using the Chinese banking system and obtain military material were dismissed. The analysis was that Beijing is well aware that trade with Russia is not nearly as important as trade with the European Union, while Europe and Ukraine are too central to China’s Belt and Road initiative to risk a breach with the EU.

There were other BRICS meetings, notably the visit of Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, to Moscow, and Russian ministerial trips to Delhi.

India is a major customer of Russian armaments, but the poor performance of the Russian army’s mechanised units may give India pause to rethink its defence spending.

Russia is a small trading partner for South Africa, but it is an important consideration when it comes energy. Cutting Russia’s energy exports has clearly had a significant effect on global energy prices that has impacted South Africa, a net hydrocarbon importer.

South Africa’s trade with Russia is also relatively modest, but there is a possibility that the country may be relying on assistance to develop nuclear energy. In 2014 it was revealed that South Africa had entered into a secret agreement with Russia’s state nuclear industry body, Rosatom, to build eight to 10 nuclear reactors to produce 9.6 gigawatts of power.

Although the cost of this deal was not made public, it was R76bn (or 5.2 billion at current rates).

Whatever Ramaphosa’s reasoning may be, there must be a growing realisation that South Africa, despite its liberation credentials, risks finding itself on the wrong side of history.